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Abstract 
Mobile devices implementing Android operating systems inherently create opportunities to present environments 
that are conducive to anti-forensic activities. Previous mobile forensics research focused on applications and data 
hiding anti-forensics solutions. In this work, a set of modifications were developed and implemented on a 
CyanogenMod community distribution of the Android operating system. The execution of these solutions 
successfully prevented data extractions, blocked the installation of forensic tools, created extraction delays and 
presented false data to industry accepted forensic analysis tools without impacting normal use of the device. The 
research contribution is an initial empirical analysis of the viability of operating system modifications in an anti-
forensics context along with providing the foundation for future research.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The increasing integration of mobile smartphones, in today’s digitally dependant, highly networked, 
communication based societies creates an environment that is conducive to encouraging anti-forensics activities. 
According to the International Telecommunications Union [23], at the end of 2011 there were almost six billion 
mobile phone subscriptions for a world population of seven billion. In the fourth quarter of 2012, 207.7 million 
smartphones were sold with Android capturing over 50% of the operating system market [13]. Smartphones can be 
described as general-purpose computers with an attached phone. As such, many people use smartphones for their 
daily consumption, storage and communications tasks. This makes smartphones a great source of forensic evidence 
while, simultaneously, presenting interesting analysis challenges.  
Mobile smartphones are highly integrated devices that are built from non-standard components, running software 
which is often proprietary, undocumented and frequently changed. To perform a component-by-component analysis, 
an analyst would start by disassembling the phone and removing the surface mounted memory chips, which is a 
delicate and highly risky procedure. The memory chips can be read by standardized readers, but the interpretation of 
the data depends on the software running on the phone. A much easier method is to let the phone run, and access the 
data through the normal interfaces provided by the software. However, this presents a high risk of data being 
modified, both as a normal function of the phone and/or by specialized anti-forensic applications. The savings in 
time and effort gained by the utilization of normal interfaces are substantial enough that this technique is endorsed 
by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) [32] and the American National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [24]. 
Due to this acceptance, forensic analysts rely heavily on the correct functioning of the phone's software when 
performing analyses. Hence, altering functionality is a way of thwarting an analysis. Smartphones running operating 
systems such as Android and iOS are designed to allow the installation of third-party applications. This has allowed 
for the development of applications with anti-forensic functionality [7, 12, 27]. However, these applications have to 
work under the restrictions imposed by the operating system, such as application isolation and responsiveness 
demands. If anti-forensic modifications were to be made on a lower level, these restrictions would not apply in the 
same way, possibly making more advanced methods available. This idea promoted research into the hypothesis that 
it is possible to modify the Android operating system to present false information to the forensics tools. Several 
subsidiary research questions were identified in order to explore the hypothesis: 
1. Which components of the Android operating system do the forensics tools trust? 
2. Is it possible to modify these components to present false information? 
3. Can the presence of a forensic analysis tool be detected? 
4. Is it possible to make the presentation of false information reversible, such that the phone will revert to 
presenting the real information after the forensic analysis? 
The research contribution is an initial empirical analysis of the viability of operating system modifications in an 
anti-forensics context along with providing the foundation for future research in this area. The paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 discusses relevant approaches to smartphone anti-forensics. Section 3 presents the methodology, 
and the experimental design. Section 4 discusses the implementation and results. Section 5 draws conclusions from 
the research conducted and Section 6 presents future work.    
 
2. Relevant Work  
 
Recent research investigates the risk that mobile phones present to individual members of society [16] and to the 
business world [14]. It has also examined some of the challenges these devices present to forensic investigations [9, 
17, 18, 25]. Hence, it is only a matter of time before individuals, organizations and businesses implement solutions 
to mitigate these risks through anti-forensics activities.  
Anti-forensics in this case is broadly defined as “any attempts to compromise the availability or usefulness of 
evidence to the forensics process. Compromising evidence availability includes any attempts to prevent evidence 
from existing, hiding existing evidence or otherwise manipulating evidence to ensure that it is no longer within 
reach of the investigator” [19]. While several data extraction options exist for mobile devices, research has 
highlighted the fact that not all extraction solutions are equal nor do they necessarily provide the ability to validate 
results [15]. This can be attributed to an array of factors that include numerous mobile phone hardware 
configurations and vast numbers of devices in the market. Hence, the extractions that are most likely to be 
implemented with higher degrees of success are logical and manual extractions. 
Android is a young operating system, with the first commercial device, the HTC Dream, also known as the T-
Mobile G1, launched in September 2008 [31]. Hence, it is expected that the Android forensics and anti-forensics 
literature will not be as established as the ones for Windows PCs. Harris [19] classifies anti-forensics into four 
groups: hiding, destruction, source elimination and counterfeiting.  Kessler [26] also categorizes anti-forensics into 
similar groups which consist of data hiding, artifact wiping, trail obfuscation, and attacks against processes and 
tools. 
 
2.1 Data hiding 
Data hiding on mobile devices will implement substantially similar approaches to that of personal computers like 
steganography, deleted files, and storing data in the cloud or in other users' storage space. The caveat with this 
approach on mobile devices is that recovery of deleted files depends on the file system. Many mobile devices use a 
version of Yet Another Flash File System (YAFFS) [1], which may be unsupported in commercial forensics tools.  
Specific for Android is the separation between different applications enforced by the operating system. Every 
application is run as its own Linux user. Standard Linux file system permissions are used to ensure that no other 
application can read its files. This also applies to the applications uploaded to the phone by forensic analysis tools. 
This protection can only be bypassed if the phone is first rooted. If that is done, software can use the elevated 
privilege to read the entire file system. 
On a non-rooted phone, then, information can be hidden by having an application store it somewhere secluded 
and restore it at a later time (such as when the user enters a password). This approach was tested by Distefano et al. 
[12]. Their program takes data from a number of standard databases on the phone (e.g. contact list, call logs, and 
SMS messages) and user-specified files, copies this data to files in the program’s directory and deletes the originals. 
This approach also allows for quick mass deletion, since the Android package manager deletes all files private to an 
application if it is uninstalled. 
They attempted to use the forensics tool Paraben Device Seizure [30], but found that this was incompatible with 
the phone they were using. Instead, they used backup programs, which require the phone to be rooted and perform a 
logical acquisition of the phone memory. As expected, these programs were able to read the private directory where 
the data had been stored. Had the phone not been rooted, the backup programs would not have worked [20]. 
Distefano, et al. [12] say nothing about how their data hiding program is triggered, nor when data is put back. 
They do, however, include test results for how long it takes for the hiding process to run. This was on the order of 10 
seconds, depending on the amount of data to be hidden. This suggests that the hiding process is action sensitive, 
which would be the case if it was triggered by the connection or starting of a forensics tool. Presumably, the data 
would then be manually restored by the user after regaining control over the phone. 
 
2.2 Artifact wiping 
 
Artifact wiping is the act of overwriting data so that it is impossible to restore, even with un-deletion techniques. 
While the overwritten data will be irrevocably destroyed, Kessler [26] notes two weaknesses with this class of 
techniques. The first is that it may miss some data and, second, it may leave traces of wiping activity, most notably 
the presence of the wiping tool. A large portion of the existing Android anti-forensic literature is concentrated on 
artifact wiping. 
Albano, et al. [3] describes a technique for sanitizing a phone by removing deleted files. Their technique works 
by booting a custom recovery image, copying all files to an external storage device, overwriting the entire internal 
memory and copying the files back. The recovery image is a minimal operating system image which was originally 
intended for performing a complete reset of the phone but which can be replaced on a rooted phone [21]. This 
procedure will make sure that any data previously deleted will now be irrevocably lost, but has the disadvantage of 
being an off-line procedure requiring significant time and manual effort. 
Another pattern of design for artifact wiping, adopted by several researchers [7, 27], uses an application on an 
unmodified (or rooted) Android phone to detect the presence of a forensic analysis tool and start deleting data.  
To trigger the wipe, two methods have been used which include reading the system logs [7, 27] and detecting a 
USB connection. Reading the system logs has the disadvantage of being slow, since it has to wait for the event to 
occur the log message to be generated, written and finally read back in before being able to take action. 
Detecting a USB connection suffers from a lack of specificity, especially in earlier versions of Android. Version 
eight of the Android API (corresponding to Android 2.2 ‘Froyo’ [5]) is unable to use the improved USB support 
introduced in API version 12 (Android 3.1  ‘Honeycomb MR1’) and would need to be back-ported to API 10 
(Android 2.3.4 ‘Gingerbread MR1’) [6].  
Regardless of the triggering mechanism being used, the anti-forensic application then has to delete data before 
the forensic analysis tool can extract it. All papers using this approach are concerned with this time window. They 
report measurements of time taken and how much can be overwritten in that time window prior to extraction. 
 
2.3 Trail obfuscation 
 
In the area of obfuscation, Albano, et al. [2] developed an automation system which can be used to make the 
phone act as if a user is present, thereby providing false evidence that the user was where the phone was at a 
particular time. They describe several systems based on generally available software automation, testing tools and 
finally built one of their own based on recording and playing back user interactions (e.g. touch screen input). For 
recording events, they connect the phone to a PC and perform the recording over a USB debug connection. Playback 
is performed either from the recording PC or on the phone from a script file uploaded from the PC. Tests show that 
this system can be used to post messages to Facebook and send SMS messages. After sending the messages, forensic 
analyses were performed, which showed no conclusive traces of the automation system on the phone. For their 
system to work, the phone had to be rooted, and for running without being connected to a PC, a general purpose 
scheduling application had to be installed. The researchers hint at, but do not state outright, that the uploaded script 
is sufficiently obtuse not to be a significant trace. The controlling PC was run entirely in RAM from a Linux live 
CD, and thus left no traces whatsoever. 
 
2.4 Attacks against processes and tools 
 
Procedures used by computer forensic analysts are supposed to follow the public guidelines set by central bodies 
(e.g., ACPO and NIST). It is, therefore, relevant to design anti-forensic tools to attack these procedures. An example 
would be hiding information where only a single, password protected program can access it, as in Distefano, et al.'s 
[12] design. In this case, the analyst can choose between following procedure and not getting the data or rooting the 
phone and getting the data and violating ACPO principle one, e.g., not modifying the data on the device. 
Smartphones are complex, integrated devices, often necessitating the use of the entire original system in the 
analysis. This stands in contrast to personal computers, which consist of discrete components connected through 
standard interfaces which can be examined one by one, thereby bypassing some protection. For this reason, the 
published standards condone much more invasive examinations for mobile phones than for PCs [24]. However, 
many of these investigations take time and effort, are specific to individual phone models, require individual testing 
and require potentially in-depth explanations in court environments. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
This research aims to investigate the potential effectiveness of Android operating system-level anti-forensics 
modifications. The idea focuses on the modification of the operating system to deceive automated tools. Any tool 
could have been chosen for the examination of the hypothesis. As a matter of convenience, Cellebrite (version: App: 
1.1.9.4 UFED, Full: 1.0.2.7, Tiny: 1.0.2.1) [8] and XRY (version: 6.1.1) [28] were used in this particular 
experiment. The phone that was used in the research was a HTC Desire running the CyanogenMod distribution of 
Android. The following steps were executed in this experiment. 
The first step was to investigate operating system modifications. In order to achieve this, the source code for the 
CyanogenMod 7.2 community distribution of Android was downloaded, built and installed according to the 
CyanogenMod project's instructions [10]. Once the phone was running this version of CyanogenMod, modifications 
were introduced to trace the behavior of the forensics tools. Content providers are applications that wrap databases 
on the phone, performing security checks and format conversions as required by the Android specifications. On the 
assumption that both Cellebrite and XRY used content providers to access data on the phone, these modifications 
took the form of altering the content providers to generate logs of how they are called. The merits of this assumption 
are discussed further in section 4.1 
The second step consulted Android documents for information on the returned data format for each call. 
According to the documentation for Cellebrite and XRY, they both used a USB debugging connection to extract 
data from Android phones. To determine what information is available for triggering anti-forensic behavior, a 
separate application was developed that produces event logs as noted by the operating system when this connection 
is established and severed. While a USB device (such as a phone) must identify itself to its host (i.e. a forensic 
analysis system), the device does not learn anything about the host [29]. This means that the phone cannot 
distinguish the connection of a forensic analysis system from the connection of a PC. However, Cellebrite and XRY 
(and according to Azadegan, et al. [7], Paraben Device Seizure [30] and Susteen Secure View [22]) work by 
uploading an application to the phone over Android's standard USB debug interface [11]. In addition, they also 
indicate that these applications export the data over the USB debug interface. 
The third step modified the content providers to recognize when they were being called by forensics tools. This 
takes into account the information from the separate programs on how to recognize USB debugging and behavior 
specific to the tools. The idea is to make the content providers exhibit anti-forensic behavior when they detect the 
presence of the forensics tools, but still be sufficiently close to the original behavior for the forensics tools to believe 
in the data they receive.  
The anti-forensic behaviors will inject a delay before returning any data, returning no data, returning data 
hardcoded in the content provider and/or returning data from an alternate database. The full range of anti-forensics 
will be implemented for the phone's contact list. To prove that the techniques can be generalized, modifications will 
be introduced to return no data for queries for the SIM contact list and SMS messages. When anti-forensics is used, 
the real data should not be extracted, the intended false data should be extracted and no errors should be reported. 
The package manager will be modified to detect attempts by the forensics tools to install their applications on the 
phone, and reject the installation. In this case, the tools will be permitted to report errors to the forensic analyst, but 
no data should be returned. 
The fourth step created and entered a dataset into the phone. The phone contacts were entered using the 
standard on-board tools, and contained two entries, each with a name and a phone number. The contacts were not 
synchronized with any other service.  
The fifth step performed forensic extractions using both Cellebrite and XRY. The first extractions were 
conducted with the phone running an unmodified CyanogenMod operating system and then with each anti-forensic 
modification in turn. The results of the extractions were inspected for the real data, the false data for that anti-
forensic case and any signs of the tools suspecting that something was wrong. 
It should be noted that this research is intended to be a proof of concept that instigates a focused examination of 
contact artifacts using both logical and manual extractions. All other artifacts and interactions with the mobile 
phones are considered out of scope for this research. 
 
4. Implementation and Results  
 
The experimental work for this research consists of the three stages of examination, implementation and testing.  
 
4.1 Examination 
 
The content provider interface is the only way for forensics tools to gain access to information such as the 
contact list on an un-rooted Android phone. On a rooted phone, it would be possible for a forensics tool to bypass 
the content provider and read directly from the database, but this would require the tool to first find and interpret the 
database. 
Under the assumption that the content provider is always used, instrumentation code was developed and inserted 
into it to write information about its behavior to the system log. For each call to the content provider's main query 
function, the code output the name of the calling program, the query arguments and which part of the existing 
program logic handled the query.  
Both of the tools used the content provider in all observed cases. Cellebrite starts by making several queries to 
the raw contacts and settings modules, collecting general information such as the number of contacts and whether 
contacts are marked as deleted. It then goes through the raw contacts module, querying for information on each 
contact. For each contact, numerous queries are made for different kinds of information associated with it (name, 
phone number, email address, etc.). The extracted contact list matched the information entered and seen in the 
phone's built-in contact list application. 
The program revealed that XRY makes relatively few queries in total, retrieving an entire data module with each 
query. The modules retrieved are raw contacts and data. It is possible for XRY to interpret this data using 
information found in the Android API reference manual [4]. The extracted contact list, seen in Figure 1 – XRY 
unmodified phone extraction, matched that entered and displayed in the phone's built-in contact list application. 
 
 
Figure 1 -- XRY unmodified phone extraction 
 
4.2 Implementation 
 
Previous work has triggered anti-forensic behavior either on finding log-entries relating to the installation of 
forensics tools or on connection of a USB cable. Reading logs requires waiting for the log messages to show up 
along with spending processing effort to read and interpret the log files. This is complicated by the fact that USB 
connections are frequent in everyday use which, potentially, generates a substantial amount of data to process. 
One attribute common to the forensics tools used in this research is that they require the phone to be set to USB 
debug mode. This lets the tool control the phone and installed applications. Setting the phone to debug mode 
requires going deep into the settings menu and acknowledging a warning that ‘USB debugging is intended for 
development purposes only’. It also removes the possibility to use the phone as USB memory as well as transfer 
files to and from it using standard file management tools. The fact that activating debug mode removes these normal 
and desirable features suggests that most users will not have debug mode activated. If so, triggering anti-forensic 
behavior upon activation of USB debugging will have a lower false-positive rate than triggering it on all USB 
connections. A stand-alone application was built to be a receiver for the intent broadcast when the USB state of the 
phone is changed. Using the extra information contained in the intent, the program determines whether the USB 
cable is connected or not, and whether the phone is in debugging mode. 
Finding no data in a well-used phone would be suspicious. Arranging for the analyst to find plausible, but non-
incriminating, data increases the chance of the analyst accepting the output and concluding that the phone holds no 
relevant data. While examining the behavior of the forensics tools and the operating system, sufficient data was 
obtained to determine the format for the extracted contact list. Using that information, false data in the correct 
formats was constructed and inserted into the code for the contacts provider. This data is to be returned in response 
to queries from each tool. As a fallback, if a query comes from an unknown tool and USB debugging is on, no 
results will be returned. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
The operating system was rebuilt to contain the module, uploaded to the phone and installed using the recovery 
image. This replaced the operating system already on the phone, but preserved user data such as contact lists and 
SMS messages. Each modified version of CyanogenMod was approximately 90 MB in size and took slightly less 
than one minute to install.  
The phone was reinstalled using a standard CyanogenMod 7.2 operating system. The monitoring application will 
be installed and started. With the monitoring application running, the USB cable will be plugged and unplugged 
with the phone in both USB mass storage and USB debugging modes. The messages printed by the application 
should match the state of the USB cable and settings. Two screenshots from the running application are in Figure 2 - 
USB debugging on and in Figure 3 - USB debugging off.  
Both images contain mostly raw information, so the processed information indicating USB connection and 
debugger state has been indicated with outlines. The debugger is indicated by its name “ADB", which stands for 
“Android Debug Bridge" [4] . 
 
 
Figure 2 - USB debugging on 
 
 
Figure 3 - USB debugging off 
 
4.3.1 Response delays. The phone was reinstalled using a modified CyanogenMod 7.2 operating system. The 
only modification from default was the insertion of a delay into each query of the contact list provider. Extractions 
of the contact list were performed using Cellebrite and XRY and the delay increased until the tools presented errors 
instead of performing successful extractions. 
Cellebrite has a low tolerance for response delays. It accepts a delay of five seconds at each call to query(), but 
ten seconds is enough to make it abort the extraction and show the error message in Figure 4 – Cellebrite error 
message.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Cellebrite error message 
 
When this error happens, no report is created and no data is extracted, even if other information on the phone 
could have been extracted successfully. Adding a five second delay to each call lengthens the extraction time from 
approximately 25 seconds for an unmodified phone (Figure 5 – No delays) to approximately 2 minutes 20 seconds 
(Figure 6 – Delay 5 seconds per query call). 
 
 
Figure 5 - No delays 
 
 
Figure 6 - Delay 5 seconds per query call 
 
4.3.2 Rejecting installation of forensics tools. The phone was reinstalled using a modified CyanogenMod 7.2 
operating system. The only difference from the standard code was the modifications to the package manager for 
rejecting installation of applications named ‘com.client.appA’ or ‘example.helloandroid’ which previous 
experiments determined were the names used by the applications uploaded to the phone by Cellebrite and XRY, 
respectively. Extractions of the contact list were performed using Cellebrite and XRY. The extraction results were 
compared to results from an unmodified CyanogenMod. 
Cellebrite completely failed to perform the extraction, instead presenting the error message in Figure 7 - 
Cellebrite installation rejected. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Cellebrite installation rejected  
 
XRY completed the extraction. However, a message indicates that an error had occurred and that the extraction 
was incomplete. The error log is displayed in Figure 8 – XRY extraction log. The log was not particularly clear on 
what went wrong and the extent of the consequences. The report was missing the sections for Device/App Usage, 
Contacts and Web/Bookmarks. 
 
4.3.3 Hardcoded false contact list. The phone was reinstalled using a standard CyanogenMod 7.2 operating 
system. Using the built-in contact list application, two contacts were entered into the phone contact list (see Figure 9 
– Contact list). Extractions of the contact list were performed using Cellebrite and XRY, and both extractions 
successfully displayed the correct contact information for both contacts. 
 
 
Figure 8 - XRY extraction log 
 
The contact list database was copied from the phone to a PC. The phone was reinstalled using a modified 
CyanogenMod 7.2, the only difference from the standard operating system being the contact list provider, which 
contained hardcoded false data. Three sets of false data were tested.  
 
 
Figure 9 - Contact list 
 
Cellebrite and XRY were provided with contact lists containing one contact each, this being the technical 
support phone number for each tool. Unknown tools will be provided with an empty contact list. Cellebrite and 
XRY were used, in turn, to extract the phone contact list. Both tools displayed the same number of contacts as in the 
real contact list, but each displayed the name and number to technical support for the respective tool. The display of 
false data is demonstrated in Figure 10 - Cellebrite extraction report and in Figure 11 - XRY extraction report.  
 
 
Figure 10 - Cellebrite extraction report 
 
Figure 11 - XRY extraction report 
 
Finally to simulate the connection of an unknown forensics tool, the phone was connected to a PC still in USB 
debugging mode and the contact list inspected using the built-in application. In this case, the built-in application 
shows an empty contact list, as seen in Figure 12 - Empty contact list. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Empty contact list 
 
4.3.4 Alternative Databases. The phone was reinstalled using a modified CyanogenMod 7.2 operating system. The 
contact list provider was modified to return results from alternate databases depending on whether the query comes 
from Cellebrite, XRY or the phone itself outside of USB debugging mode. 
When the contact list was entered manually, the phone software created an SQLite database file on the phone 
and stored it in /data/data/com.android. providers.contacts/databases/contacts2.db. This file was copied to a PC in 
two instances and changed to contain the technical support phone numbers for Cellebrite and XRY, respectively. 
These changed database files were uploaded to the phone to be used by the modified contact list provider. These 
databases were stored in /data/data/com.android.providers. contacts/databases/cellebrite.db and /data/data/com 
.android.providers.contacts/databases/xry.db.  
The extractions of the phones contact list were performed using Cellebrite and XRY. Neither tool saw the two 
real contacts. Both tools displayed a single number which is their own technical support phone numbers. The results 
are available in Figure 13 - XRY alternate database and in Figure 14 - Cellebrite alternate database. 
 
 
Figure 13 - XRY alternate database  
 
Figure 14 - Cellebrite alternate database  
 
4.3.5 Delayed restoration. The phone was reinstalled using a modified CyanogenMod 7.2 operating system. The 
contact list provider was modified to return results from alternate databases, as in the previous test. In addition, the 
provider was also modified to continue returning the same false contact list for thirty seconds after the USB cable 
had been unplugged regardless of which tool was used for the extraction. The purpose of this delay is to address a 
scenario where the analyst performs a manual check after the tool has finished its automatic extraction. 
The experiment was re-run and displayed the same results from the previous test. For both tools, the phone was 
disconnected from the USB cable and the contact list inspected using the built-in contact list application. This 
inspection displayed the number for the respective technical support. After thirty seconds were allowed to pass, the 
built-in contact list application was re-opened. At that point, it showed the two contacts in the real contact list.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Conducting mobile phone forensics investigations is an increasingly challenging and complex undertaking. The 
interest in mobile device anti-forensics is increasing from within both academia and industrial environments. The 
complexity of the environment coupled with anti-forensics operating system modifications potentially inhibits 
mobile phone forensics investigation. 
The results from this research demonstrate that it is possible to modify an Android operating system to present 
false information to the forensics tools. The forensics tools trust the phone software to return the correct results. The 
means that the tools are trusting file system drivers, the installation package manger and lower level functions.  
The tools in this experiment performed logical acquisitions of the devices. Assuming the phone is supported, the 
tools in the experiment can be used to perform a physical acquisition of the phone’s entire memory, thereby 
bypassing the high-level phone software and only trusting the phone's file system driver to return the correct files. 
However, using that mode of acquisition requires that the tool or the analyst perform data interpretation themselves, 
without the help of the phone software. Both tools also use standard methods of installing software, thereby trusting 
the package manager to install that software correctly. These high-level software packages, in turn, trust the lower 
levels to function correctly. Therefore, the forensics tools also trust, by extension, all lower levels of the Android 
stack, including the Dalvik virtual machine, the Linux kernel and the hardware. Any component of a system under 
forensic analysis that is trusted by one party is a point of attack for their opponent. Since the content providers and 
package manager are trusted components, they are natural targets for anti-forensics activities.  
The research demonstrates that it is possible to modify components to present false data. This task is aided by the 
fact that Android is an open system, with specifications and source code that are freely available. Several projects 
use that source code to build community distributions of Android which can be installed on many different models 
of phones. The installation requires that the phone be rooted, which is possible to do on many phones and popular 
among technologically sophisticated consumers. Step-by-step guides, available on the Internet, describe how to root 
phones and install community distributions of Android. These community distributions depend upon contributions 
of code from the general public. They, therefore, make it easy to modify their code and install the modified versions. 
While programming skills are a prerequisite, it is possible to modify and replace content providers and the package 
manager. In this research, the OS components that were modified allowed for activity on the phone to be monitored 
and responses to be customized based on the state of the device. 
In broad security terms, behavior that is repeated provides a foundation for identification. If that behavior is not 
the same as that produced by regular use, it presents an opportunity for anomaly detection. The tools in this 
experiment provided both. Every time the tool behavior was observed, each utilized the same specific name for the 
uploaded application. The tools also queried the content providers in the same way. They both also require the 
phone to be in USB debugging mode, which is unlikely to be the case for a phone in regular use.  
The experiments performed here have shown that it is possible to distinguish between normal use and forensic 
analysis by looking at whether USB debugging is enabled, and that it is possible to distinguish between different 
forensics tools by looking at the names of their applications. 
Mobile phone anti-forensics is concerned, to a large degree, with overwriting or deleting information. While this 
potentially makes the data completely unavailable to the forensic analyst, it also makes it unavailable to the 
legitimate user if the phone is eventually returned. Providing false data to the analyst presents the possibility of 
hiding the real data and reverting to it after the completed analysis.  
The anti-forensics solutions implemented for this research demonstrates that it is possible, from a proof of 
concept perspective, to deceive a device implementing a logical acquisition. The real information is left in its place, 
while false information is fed to forensics tools from other sources. Forensics tools place a great deal of trust in the 
Android software, but that software can easily be modified and replaced. When suitably modified and replaced, that 
software can feed false information to the tool. Neither tool used in this research detects this subterfuge and presents 
the false information to the analyst as if it was real. The anti-forensics software modules are present on the phone 
and can be seen by the analyst should they do a logical extraction of the phone's file system. However, their 
presence and function is not obvious and, even if they are detected, reverse-engineering them potentially requires 
significant time and effort from the analyst. The results of this research empirically support the idea that examiners 
should not rely on a single tool or extraction method in their analysis of mobile devices. 
 
6. Future Work   
 
Future mobile phone anti-forensics work will examine additional options for triggering anti-forensics behavior at 
both the operating system and the hardware levels. Additional work should also investigate solutions at these levels 
that would counter additional extraction techniques like physical extraction or chip removal. More sophisticated 
triggers could include investigating single or multiple calls to areas of the phone such as raw_contacts. These calls 
could also be coupled with a series of other activities and/or states of the device. Monitoring queries on a mobile 
device in conjunction with the state of the device could provide insight into device data traffic patterns.  
Presenting false data whenever the network connection is lost may be a valid anti-forensic strategy. The 
connection may be legitimately lost during everyday use, for example, by the user walking into an underground rail 
station. In this case, the phone functionality is unavailable to the user anyway, so the unavailability of phone-related 
data may not be a significant drawback. 
The combination of destructive data techniques with operating system modification should be explored as well. 
The improved hiding and triggering properties found by implementing anti-forensics in the operating system over 
using a standalone application would also be able to hide destructive anti-forensics routines. For example, the 
package manager could be extended to not only reject the installation of forensics tools, but use the installation 
attempt as a trigger to perform a complete wipe of the phone. This would free the anti-forensics routines from the 
timing constraints which apply when they run as a separate application. 
After various anti-forensics options have been explored, investigations will take place into how to effectively 
detect operating system modifications and the most efficient way for law enforcement to confront these issues. This 
includes investigating additional activities to trigger similar behaviors that are not necessarily intentional anti-
forensics techniques.  Additional work by the authors will examine the creation of custom ROMs that will introduce 
additional forensics capabilities along with exploring crossover issues with Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
solutions in organizations. 
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